Soccer Dad

Bs from brzezinski and solarz

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stephen Solarz writing in today's Washington Post argue To achieve Mideast peace, Obama must make a bold Mideast trip.

Meryl, effectively fisks it, concluding:

To sum up: Brzezinski effectively wants Obama to force Israel to accede to a peace plan that the United States will dictate. Though he says there will be consequences for both sides if either refuses to go along, that will never happen. Consequences will fall only on Israel's head; the Palestinians will, as always, be excused. If Obama does follow a plan like this, the road to a UN Security Council condemnation of Israel will not be far behind.

Yet another one-sided peace plan, but the really frightening thing about it: I'm sure Obama will love it. After all, it's the Chicago Way.

If you doubt that's the case, Daled Amos makes an astute observation:

Throughout his entire op-ed, Brzezinski does not mention Abbas--not even once. Instead, it is Obama who is supposed to play the part of Sadat. The Palestinian Arabs are relieved of the responsibility of negotiating. And Obama is not coming alone, as Sadat did. Instead, just to make sure Israel gets the message--the Quartet is coming along too, along with Arab leaders.

If Brzezinski was interested in selling peace to both sides, wouldn't he mention Abbas at least once? Instead, it's clear that his (and Solarz's) purpose is how best to pressure Israel.

There was something else that struck me about the article that Israel Matzav notes:

The difference between Sadat and Obama is obvious: Sadat was the party with whom we were supposed to make peace. He came and said he wanted to make peace, and then he never made another statement calling for Israel's destruction. Obama is not Sadat. We're not (supposed to be) making peace with Obama. We're supposed to be making peace with Abu Mazen. Would Abu Mazen come to Israel and make an unconditional statement like Sadat made before the Knesset ('no more war, no more bloodshed')? No. Even if Abu Mazen made such a statement, could he force it on his people? No. Would Abu Mazen be willing to pay with his life for making such a statement as Sadat did? No.

Israel Matzav makes another important point. If everyone knows what the parameters of peace will look like - as Brzezinski and Solarz claim - why have the Palestinians rejected (or ignored) such offers by former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert? Why would President Obama's "bold trip" change their minds?

Why are Brzezinski and Solarz promoting a "bold" trip (and speech) by President Obama? Didn't he already to that when he spoke in Cairo last year?

Keep in mind that last year he consulted King Abdullah before the speech but when he asked for Saudi Arabia to offer some sort of confidence building measures to Israel in the wake of the speech, he was rebuffed.

Obama asked the Saudis to make concessions to match the concessions he had demanded from the Israelis. But the Saudi King balked -- and "launched a tirade" that his underlings later apologized for. The New York Times has also reported that Obama was "frustrated" by his trip to Saudi Arabia and that he "failed to extract any meaningful gestures toward Israel to revive the peace process."

Given the "success" of President Obama's previous "bold" trip, why would Brzesinski and Solarz expect success from a future one?

One last point, also appearing in today's Sunday Outlook section is an op-ed by Ray Tayekh which argues:

If Iran dismisses threats from the Gulf states, it similarly discounts the possibility of U.S. military retaliation. Since becoming Iran's president in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hard-line supporters have assured their compatriots that U.S. preoccupations with Iraq and Afghanistan provide Iran with a deterrent policy. No American administration, they insist, is likely to jeopardize the fragile stability of its war-torn charges by forcefully taking on Iran's nuclear portfolio. It is entirely possible that Iranians are once more misjudging America's predilections. The history of the Middle East, after all, is riddled with rulers who misapprehended Washington's intentions. However misguided they may be, Iran's leaders comfort themselves with thoughts that their nuclear provocations will not trigger American retribution.

Israel, then, looms large in Iran's strategic calculations. Unlike the Arab states, Israel approaches Iran with resolution. And unlike the United States, Israel is not entangled in conflicts that Iranian mischief can aggravate. Hamas and Hezbollah are not only unreliable proxies but ones that Israeli armor can handle. Fulminations aside, Iranian leaders take Israeli threats seriously and are at pains to assert their retaliatory options. It is here that the shape and tone of the U.S.-Israeli alliance matters most. Should the clerical oligarchs sense divisions in that alliance, they can assure themselves that a beleaguered Israel cannot possibly strike Iran while at odds with its superpower patron. Such perceptions cheapen Israeli deterrence and diminish the potency of the West's remaining sticks.

I don't agree with the whole op-ed, but that point is worth remembering: pressuring Israel emboldens Iran. Clearly, the Obama administration is clinging to its deeply held beliefs rather than thinking outside of its exceedingly limited box.