Soccer Dad

Ready to surge

Charles Krauthammer, after criticizing the President for his inordinate criticism of his predecessor explains the choice in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, the heavy footprint -- also known as the surge -- dramatically reversed the fortunes of war. In Afghanistan, where it took longer for the Taliban to regroup, the failure of the light footprint did not become evident until more recently, when an uneasy stalemate began to deteriorate into steady Taliban advances.

That's where we are now in Afghanistan. The logic of a true counterinsurgency strategy there is that whatever resentment a troop surge might occasion pales in comparison with the continued demoralization of any potential anti-Taliban elements unless they receive serious and immediate protection from U.S.-NATO forces.

In other words, Obama is facing the same decision on Afghanistan that Bush faced in late 2006 in deciding to surge in Iraq.
ad_icon

In both places, the deterioration of the military situation was not the result of "drift," but of considered policies that seemed reasonable, cautious and culturally sensitive at the time but that ultimately turned out to be wrong.

Of course there's one more possibility (at least) that what worked in Iraq won't work in Afghanistan. Barry Rubin explains:

As for the rest, in Iraq, it is important who governs. In Afghanistan, it is only important that the Taliban does not govern.

America succeeded in Iraq--succeeded, that is, if "success" is defined modestly--because there was a force that could be nurtured and defended until it was ready to take hold as a stable government capable of governing the country. Even here, though, we should have no illusions about the unity, honesty, stability, and moderation of such a regime. Let's not forget, too, that the strongest part of that force are somewhat Islamist-oriented Shia politicians.

Nevertheless, on the positive side, for their own interests they want to get along with the United States in part because the mainly Sunni Arab states have rejected it or are even indirectly (especially Syria but also Saudi Arabia) attacking it. The other part of the ruling coalition are the Kurds who have no foreign ambitions and need U.S. support against enemies that surround them as well. And this coalition has no interest in being aggressive toward Iraq's neighbors or causing regional crises.

In Afghanistan, there is no way to win. Instead, there's a hodgepodge of ethnic groups and tribes which aren't going to work together and will also fight the kind of hegemony represented by both the current regime and by the Taliban.

Moreover, Afghanistan is so culturally traditionalist, so puritanically Islamic that no matter how much gum American soldiers give kids, no matter how many schools they build, no matter how much money is paid out, most Afghans are still going to hate the United States.

In other words, maybe a different strategy is needed for Afghamistan.

Daniel PIpes is even more pessimistic.