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Will engagement deter iran?

The New York Times reports:

Reports from Tehran this week have suggested persistently that Iran will seek changes in the latest plan, which was drafted by Iranian and Western negotiators in Vienna last week. The proposal provides for Iran to ship 2,645 pounds of low-enriched uranium to Russia for further processing. That amount, representing most of the country's known stockpile of low-enriched uranium, would take about a year to replace.

In the meantime, Iran would not have enough nuclear material to build a weapon, and there would be more time to prepare an international agreement on Iran's nuclear ambitions. The uranium would be returned to Iran in the form of fuel rods, usable only in a civilian nuclear facility and not for weapons.

The pro-government newspaper Javan said Thursday that Tehran would seek two changes in the plan. One modification would insist on the gradual transfer of low-enriched uranium rather than a single shipment. The other would provide for a "simultaneous exchange" of fuel for a research reactor in Tehran in return for sending low-enriched uranium abroad.

Such changes could undermine the entire plan. The French government, a party to the deal, has made it clear that the uranium must be shipped all at once before the end of the year.

Robert Kagan explains:

The first question is about to be answered. The main object of the "new era of engagement," Iran, has settled back into its old game-playing. The joint proposal agreed to by the United States, France and Russia, to have Iran ship 70 percent of its low-enriched uranium to Russia this year, was a compromise, as administration officials acknowledge. It might theoretically have delayed Iran's bomb program by a year or so -- assuming we know everything about that program -- and thus bought some time to get a better and more definitive agreement with Tehran. But it would not have stopped Iran from continuing to enrich uranium, which has been the goal of the United States and Europe for the better part of a decade. The deal, blessed and promoted by International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei, not exactly a hawk, was really more a test of Iran's intentions than a decisive breakthrough.

So now the test results are in: Iran's intentions, it seems, are not good. Tehran apparently will not accept the deal but will propose an alternate plan, agreeing to ship smaller amounts of low-enriched uranium to Russia gradually over a year. Even if Iran carried out this plan as promised -- every month would be an adventure to see how much, if anything, Iran shipped -- the slow movement of small amounts of low-enriched uranium does not accomplish the original purpose, since Iran can quickly replace these amounts with new low-enriched uranium produced by its centrifuges. Iran's nuclear clock, which the Obama administration hoped to stop or at least slow, would continue ticking at close to its regular speed.

Tehran is obviously probing to see whether President Obama can play hardball or whether he can be played. If Obama has any hope of getting anywhere with the mullahs, he needs to show them he means business, now, and immediately begin imposing new sanctions.

It would appear that the forces in Iran who are opposed to a deal are not intimidated by the West's negotiating positions:

But several influential lawmakers, the leading pro-government newspaper and the former top nuclear negotiator have all spoken out against the deal. They say the West is trying to deceive the country and keep the nuclear material in order to sabotage Iran's atomic progress.

"Iran's response is that it will not give even one milligram of its enriched uranium to be changed into 20 percent enriched uranium by foreigners," according to a column Monday in the pro-government newspaper Kayhan, which often reflects the views of decision-makers within Iran's leadership. "America, Europe and Israel, these American cowboys, old British foxes and Zionist child murderers, want to use this ploy to take Iran's uranium and not give it back."

So it would appear that engagement has not been working so well as
Victor Davis Hanson writes:

The Obama administration reaches out to enemies such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Bashar al Assad, the Castro brothers and Hugo Chávez. It pays far less attention to British, Colombian, French, Israeli and Japanese allies. In unilateral fashion we withdrew promises of land-based antiballistic missile defense from Eastern Europe, giddy that we might appease the Russians into abrogating their patronage of Iran's nuclear ambitions. But so far the centrifuges keep spinning while we appear unreliable to friends, compliant to rivals, and weak to enemies. The administration has also promised greater support to the U.N., seemingly unworried that the organization's illiberal majority has often appeased or abetted autocratic governments.

And finally Barry Rubin observes:

First, for containment of Iran to work, the United States must have credibility with both allies and enemies. That means the Iranian regime has to believe that any use of nuclear weapons or aggression will bring a full-scale American military response including even the use of nuclear weapons. Does a government led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad believe that about a government led by President Barack Obama given everything it has done or said? The answer seems closer to "no" than to "yes."

The idea of engagement as a way to deterring Iran's nuclear ambitions (which as Barry Rubin points out isn't necessarily a matter of Iran using those weapons, but a matter of its using its nuclear weapons to project its influence throughout the Middle East) is a noble one. But it isn't guaranteed to work. Iran with nuclear arms continues to be a real possibility.