Soccer Dad

Maliki or not

Unlike The Glittering Eye who saw Maliki's Basra offensive as flawed from conception and Austin Bay, who saw it as a sign of progress for the Maliki government, Max Boot steers a middle ground: correct in conception, flawed in execution:

Lacking political support and encountering a tougher than expected foe, the prime minister seems to be ceasing major combat operations. If so, that is the worst of all worlds: Having started a fight, it is imperative to finish it. By not doing more damage to the Sadrists, Maliki allows them to claim a victory. That is the same mistake the coalition made in fighting the Sadrists in 2004 and that Israel made in fighting Hezbollah (which has been training some of the Sadrists) in 2006. The situation in Iraq is made all the worse because it was an Iranian Quds Force general who finally brokered the c ceasefire in Basra, thus reinforcing Iran's dominant role in the south.

Prior to this latest outbreak General David Petraeus had been pursuing a more subtle strategy. He has been working to incorporate the more moderate Sadrist elements into the political process while sending Iraqi and American Special Operations forces to capture or kill the ruthless Special Groups that are funded and directed from Tehran and that are largely outside of Sadr’s control. Maliki has upset that calculated campaign plan, leading mainstream Jaish al Mahdi elements to take up arms alongside the Special Groups. With the Basra offensive petering out, Petraeus should be able to get back to his more low-key approach.

According to an Instapundit correspondent, it sounds like Gen. Petraeus made some omelettes out of the broken eggs.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, General Petraeus quietly and deftly encouraged the central government of Iraq to:

(a) concentrate not on JAM, but on the criminal element within JAM. "Anyone on the street with a weapon is a criminal." This effectively divided the JAM members. Next,

(b) focus on the humanitarian element of the operation. Pushing much-needed food and water to trapped inhabitants encouraged even more JAM members to stay home and take care of family members. Finally,

(c) show that fighting is not going to solve the needs of Iraq.

By addressing the essential services issues and bringing central government people to the provincial sessions to address concerns, people see their government taking an active role in solving the problem.

The effect was that Moqtada al Sadr got to make a point, Maliki demonstrated his resolve, the Iraqi Army and Police showed themselves to be capable and professional, and there's a sense of a better day coming in Basrah. Without the strong response of the central Government, the militia-led uprising could have very easily led to further lawlessness, mayhem, and devastation. The Coalition trained and helped equip and arm the Iraqi Army. The surge allowed us to clear and hold areas long enough to bring violence levels down, so the government could start focusing on essential services. If anything, the surge came too late because people have been without services for far too long.

The colonel continues:

I don't know how long before the GoI will transform into a model government able to care for its citizenry. However, if the Coalition left suddenly at this point in time, the many tribal and sectarian militias, like JAM, would seize control from the GoI. Soldiers would return home to fight for their homes and families. The country would slip into civil war along sectarian lines over distribution of oil revenues. The Sunnis would seek partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the Shia with Iran, and you can see where that would be heading. These recent insurgent attacks cannot be allowed to undermine the incredible value added by the surge. Likewise, the vital importance of remaining here until the Government of Iraq is viable cannot be overstated.

Are the Democrats listening to this counsel?

iraq.