Soccer Dad

Fuzzy intelligence

The latest NIE reports that Iran has halted its nuclear weapons development and is likely a number of years away from being able to field a nuclear weapon. This estimate is being hailed because it takes the urgency of an attack on Iran "off the table" but it brings up a problem. Norman Podhoretz asks

These findings are startling, not least because in key respects they represent a 180-degree turn from the conclusions of the last NIE on Iran’s nuclear program. For that one, issued in May 2005, assessed “with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons” and to press on “despite its international obligations and international pressure.”

In other words, a full two years after Iran supposedly called a halt to its nuclear program, the intelligence community was still as sure as it ever is about anything that Iran was determined to build a nuclear arsenal. Why then should we believe it when it now tells us, and with the same “high confidence,” that Iran had already called a halt to its nuclear-weapons program in 2003? Similarly with the intelligence community’s reversal on the effectiveness of international pressure. In 2005, the NIE was highly confident that international pressure had not lessened Iran’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, and yet now, in 2007, the intelligence community is just as confident that international pressure had already done the trick by 2003.

I can't attribute dark motives to this turnabout. I'd like to, really, but the fog of bureaucratic turf wars is not something I wish to cut through right now. Regardless, this turnaround should bring up questions about the reliability of our intelligence gathering operations rather than serve as a rebuke to a trigger happy administration.

Gabriel Schoenfeld asks the right question though

What accounts for this about face, a disavowal of a judgment reached with “high confidence”?

Schoenfeld wonders if this has something to do with the about face, though, on the surface, Asgari was seemingly providing information that pointed in the other direction.

Asgari, who according to reports is being held in a top-secret military installation, has been able to shed a new light on much of the Iranian regime's most inner workings, especially regarding the Iranian nuclear development project.

Up until now, Iran – according to known intelligence – has been building two nuclear plants, in Arak and Bushehr, and has been using centrifuges to enrich uranium.

Iran, Asgari told his interrogator's is working in another, stealth path, toward achieving its nuclear goal.

This third method involves attempts to enrich uranium by using laser beams along with certain chemicals designed to enhance the process. These trials are held in a special weapons facility in Natanz.

(much, much more at memeorandum.)
Instapundit (initially) takes the new NIE at face value, notes Well That's Convenient and asks (rhetorically)

But what could have happened in 2003 that might have persuaded the Iranians to stop work on a weapon of mass destruction?

It's a sentiment that Thomas Joscelyn considers

Assuming for the moment that Iran really did halt its program, are we to believe that a substantial U.S.-led military presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq (or potential presence in Iraq, depending on when in 2003 this change supposedly occurred), had nothing to do with Iran’s supposed decision? That is, are we to believe that U.S. led forces on Iran’s eastern and western borders had nothing to do with Tehran’s decision-making process?

Also via memeorandum

(Hmm. Remember what David Pinto wrote to Instapundit? Maybe not, but I do. I'm a nerd that way.)

Meanwhile regardless of which NIE is correct, Ha'aretz concludes:

Professionals will now argue passionately, continuing the debates between Israel's assessment (an Iranian bomb in 2009-2010) and the American one (a bomb in 2012-2013).

The Americans failed to explain Monday how they reached their new conclusions. As such, the general public will find it difficult to decide who is right. Maybe in the future, when there suddenly really is a bomb in play, or maybe not  a decision on this can be final. Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence has adopted the "most severe" approach, but the American decision maker is only affected by the Americans writing the assessment.

It does not really matter. However successful or flawed this report may be, there is a new, dramatic reality, in all aspects of the struggle against the Iranian bomb: The military option, American or Israeli, is off the table, indefinitely.

Given the American interest in the peace process and likely disinterest in Iran, Israel probably has to tread carefully even if its intelligence estimate differs from the American one.

One question: If the 2005 estimate concluded that Iran had stopped its pursuit of nuclear weapons and the new one concluded that it was now close to fielding a weapon, would the administration's critics be counseling caution or action?

UPDATE: Welcome Instapundit readers! Please look around. And if you like what you see (even if you don't) you might want to check out my co-bloggers Daled Amos and JudeoPundit.

Crossposted on Yourish.

iran.