Soccer Dad: About that report ...

September 10, 2007

About that report ...

Senators McCain and Lieberman argue for staying the counterinsurgency course. In Listening to Gen. Petraeus they conclude

Whatever the shortcomings of our friends in Iraq, they are no excuse for us to retreat from our enemies like al Qaeda and Iran, who pose a mortal threat to our vital national interests. We must understand that today in Iraq we are fighting and defeating the same terrorist network that attacked on 9/11. As al Qaeda in Iraq continues to be hunted down and rooted out, and the Iraqi Army continues to improve, the U.S. footprint will no doubt adjust. But these adjustments should be left to the discretion of Gen. Petraeus, not forced on our troops by politicians in Washington with a 6,000-mile congressional screwdriver, and, perhaps, an eye on the 2008 election.

The Bush administration clung for too long to a flawed strategy in this war, despite growing evidence of its failure. Now advocates of withdrawal risk making the exact same mistake, by refusing to re-examine their own conviction that Gen. Petraeus's strategy cannot succeed and that the war is "lost," despite rising evidence to the contrary.

The Bush administration finally had the courage to change course in Iraq earlier this year. After hearing from Gen. Petraeus today, we hope congressional opponents of the war will do the same.

Seemingly on the same page out of necessity but not out of conviction seems to be George Will in Letting the Soldiers do the Thinking

The officers here -- 71 percent have served in Iraq, 34 percent in Afghanistan, many in both -- are doing something their civilian leaders did negligently five years ago -- thinking.

They think America needs, in the words of one officer, "an expeditionary capacity other than military." Officers here especially admire the introduction to the University of Chicago's edition of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Written by Sarah Sewall of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, it says:

We see in Iraq "military doctrine attempting to fill a civilian vacuum." In counterinsurgency, "nonmilitary capacity is the exit strategy," which is problematic when "more people play in Army bands than serve in the U.S. foreign service." Counterinsurgency "relies upon nonkinetic activities like providing electricity, jobs, and a functioning judicial system. . . . But U.S. civilian capacity has proved wholly inadequate in Afghanistan and Iraq." The military is "in a quandary about the limits of its role" as it is forced "to assume the roles of mayor, trash collector and public works employer."

Will would have preferred if America hadn't invaded Iraq in 2003, with no or ill-defined goals. But now that it has he's signing on to the counterinsurgency, even if it means that the military will now be acting in a non-military capacity.

A cynical NY Times editorial accuses a cynical President of hiding behind a cynical Gen. Petraeus.

President Bush, however, seems to be aiming for maximum political advantage � not maximum clarity on Iraq�s military and political crises, which cannot be separated from each other. Mr. Bush, we fear, isn�t looking for the truth, only for ways to confound the public, scare Democrats into dropping their demands for a sound exit strategy, and prolong the war until he leaves office. At times, General Petraeus gives the disturbing impression that he, too, is more focused on the political game in Washington than the unfolding disaster in Iraq. That serves neither American nor Iraqi interests.

Of course garnering political support is essential to President Bush's intent to improve the situation in Iraq. And are the editors of the NY Times so certain that a withdrawal of American troops won't leave an even bigger problem for Mr. Bush's successor? Wars are not neat endeavors that can be wrapped up when one term ends. Yet that seems exactly what the editors of the Times want!

In Accepting Iraqi Reality the editors of the Washington Post question whether a continued military presence will accomplish anything if the Iraqi central government makes no progress in reconciliation

The most important question, however, must be faced by Mr. Bush: If Iraqis are not moving toward political reconciliation, what justifies a continuing commitment of U.S. troops, with the painful sacrifices in lives that entails? U.S. generals have said repeatedly that tactical military successes will be unsustainable without political breakthroughs. The Jones commission said that the "sustained progress" it believes is possible within the Iraqi Security Forces "depends on such a political agreement." If there is to be no political accord in the near future -- and such an accord seems as distant today as it did in January -- what will be the goals of the U.S. mission in Iraq? The president needs to spell out concrete and realistic aims for American forces -- and limit troop levels to those necessary to accomplish them.

Despite that rather harsh conclusion the bulk of the editorial is much tougher on Congressional Democrats But Democrats who have spent the past few months proclaiming that "this war is lost," as Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) put it, also have an adjustment to make. That's because the military results of the past few months have been in some respects undeniably positive. The surge appears to have modestly improved security in and around Baghdad and reversed the previous momentum toward all-out civil war. According to the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, a group of retired U.S. military officers and police commissioned by Congress, there has been improvement in the Iraqi army and security forces, and more progress can be expected if U.S. training programs continue.

Most significant is that both the commission and other outside experts agree with the administration's assessment that a major change has taken place in Sunni-populated areas of Iraq -- one that offers the prospect of a military victory over the forces that have been the principal enemies of U.S. troops since 2003. Dozens of Sunni tribes and tens of thousands of their fighters, many of them former insurgents, have allied themselves with American troops and are now helping to combat al-Qaeda in Iraq. The commission, chaired by former Gen. James L. Jones, described a "dramatically improved . . . security situation in Anbar" province, once the epicenter of the war, and added that "there are positive indications that popular support for al-Qaeda in Iraq is decreasing dramatically in other provinces as well."

If one believes - as I do - that the big failure of American foreign policy prior to 9/11 was the failure to recognize failed states as breeding grounds for terror organizations, the success of the counterinsurgency is important well beyond Iraq. It may well represent our best line of defense against future 9/11's. Obviously there is quite a bit of dissent about that view. That's why it's essential that Gen. Petraeus make a convincing case that the effort must not stop now. (In other words he needs to be clear about what has been accomplished as well as about what can and cannot be accomplished.

iraq, general petraeus, war on terror.