Soccer Dad: Harsh and unhealthy editorial attitudes

May 02, 2007

Harsh and unhealthy editorial attitudes

In today's editorial the NY Times writes about A Harsh Healthy verdict in Israel

Initially, Israelis applauded Mr. Olmert’s decision to conduct sustained airstrikes in Lebanon. They saw it as a firm and justified response to provocative cross-border Hezbollah raids and rocket attacks. But when 34 days of destructive warfare ended with Hezbollah’s military capacities largely intact, its political standing enhanced and much of the world blaming Israel for the damage inflicted on Lebanese civilians, opinion turned sharply against Mr. Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and the top Israeli military leadership.

There's so much garbage in that one paragraph (not to mention the rest of the editorial, it's hard to know where to start.

Below I've excerpted NYT editorials from this past summer. A few themes emerge about the mindset of the editors of the Times.
1) The NYT approved of Israel's response to a provocation.
2) The NYT only approved a limited response that didn't endanger civilians.
3) That a UN enforced ceasefire was the only acceptable ending to the conflict.
4) That Israel's response only helped Hezbollah (and Hamas.)

Actually while it may be true that the NYT approved of an Israeli response to the kidnappings of the 3 soldiers, the terms that they'd allow Israel are so constrained as to be meaningless.

Go back about 4 months before the war in Lebanon. It's March 2006 and Hamas has threatened to break Ahmed Saadat out of prison and threatened the American and British monitors who were supposed to be watching him. Saadat had been in this special jail - as part of an agreement to stop fighting in 2002 - for the murder of Israeli cabinet minister Rehavam Zeevi. Israel launched a raid to make sure that Saadat stayed behind bars.

So how did the NYT treat Israel's effort to ensure that the PA didn't renege? Well it was an election ploy according to an editorial As if that fire needed more fuel

The acting Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, should not have allowed the desire to do some election- season muscle-flexing to push him into storming the prison in Jericho, a Palestinian-run city, with tanks, bulldozers and helicopters. Israeli army officials ordered inmates to strip to their underwear, which many did, marching out with clothing on their heads, an embarrassing and completely unnecessary provocation that trampled the dignity of any Palestinian watching that spectacle.

While the underwear stripping may have been a bit much, it probably wasn't an unreasonable precaution to make sure that the prisoners were unarmed. The point is that previous violence had stopped due to an agreement with the Palestinians. The Palestinians were now seeking to abrogate that agreement but they were one of three parties to blame for the incident instead of the primary culprits according to the wise people of the NYT.

If this Israeli raid drew a condemnation from the NYT, it's hard to imagine any meaningful response from Israel to the Hamas and Hezbollah attacks gaining approval of the Times.

In explaining why Israelis were frustrated with their government's prosecution of the war that despite the IDF's efforts Hezbollah's military capacity remained largely intace. Gen Yaakov Amidror provided a rebuttal to that notion.

Hizballah casualties were not less than 500 and may have reached 700 - a figure greater than all the casualties Hizballah has suffered during the last twenty years. It will take Hizballah at least two years to rebuild its capabilities and to recruit and train new people.
Israel also developed a system which made Hizballah's long-range rocket launchers good for one use only. Within less than five minutes of launch they were destroyed by Israel's air force, an unprecedented achievement in modern warfare.

This doesn't mean that Hezbollah was crippled, just that it's capacity was diminished. Of course that hasn't prevented it from re-arming, under the noses of and with the complicity of the very international force the NYT championed.

But the U.N. mandate determines that in the event that UNIFIL personnel come across caches of weapons or gunmen, they should call upon the Lebanese army to handle the situation. The European-enhanced UNIFIL not only shows little inclination to use force to implement UNSCR 1701 but also hampers Israeli monitoring of weapons trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The French government, for example, denounced Israeli flights over Lebanon to monitor continuing violations of the arms embargo by Hezbollah. On October 19, 2006, the French commander of UNIFIL even threatened to shoot at Israeli planes if they came too close to his troops.[61] A few days later, Berlin complained that Israeli planes had taken aim at one of their ships.[62]

Unfortunately, the U.N. favors ineffectiveness over conflict. Secretary-general Kofi Annan advocated "flexibility" in the deployment of UNIFIL along the Syria-Lebanon border,[63] in effect blessing non-enforcement. Damascus has continued to funnel arms to Hezbollah, something that both prominent Lebanese officials and the U.S. government acknowledge.[64]

By November 2006, according to Israeli military officials, Hezbollah had replenished nearly half of its prewar stockpiles of short-range missiles and small arms.[65] In December 2006, Mossad chief Meir Dagan told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Syria continued to arm Hezbollah and sought to overthrow the independent-leaning Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.[66]

In short as an end to the war this past summer, the NYT favored terms that it had to know that Hezbollah would never observe and the world would not enforce. If Hezbollah gains its full strength in short order it won't be the Israeli actions, but the international enabling that allowed it.

But if Israel's leaders didn't act properly in defending their citizens, it's also important to consider the environment in which the war was fought. There are institutions in the world that are supposed to operate impartially. Israel's wars this past summer were fought at a great handicap.

In a recent paper, Marvin Kalb described how the media often aided Hezbollah by acceding to Hezbollah demands for silence or failing to provide proper context for Israel's actions. He also tells how UNIFIL, an agency of the UN, actively aided Hezbollah during the war. Israel's performance ought to be judged in part in that context. But that is outside the scope of the editorial. The NYT could afford a "harsh and healthy" look at the ways it aided (or provided cover for) Hamas and Hezbollah in the propaganda war.

During the war the Times sounded as if Hamas and Hezbollah were students caught shooting spitballs in class.

Kidnapping Israeli soldiers to use as bargaining chips for the release of Arab prisoners is horrible behavior for groups that claim international recognition and political legitimacy, as Hamas and Hezbollah do.

Horrible behavior? Claim international recognition? The "horrible behavior" were clear violations of international law; terrorism by definition and all the outrage the NYT can must is to term them "horrible behavior." The NYT can't even bring itself to call Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations instead of using a benign description either would be thrilled with.

And while the Times is quite happy to fault the government for its ineptitude it missed one point of the Commission's report.

The ability of Hezbollah to sit ‘on the border’, its ability to dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.

The withdrawal from Lebanon didn't exactly work out as planned. Israel took an action that should have deprived Hezbollah of any legitimacy to operate and yet ...

In October 2000, Hezbollah attacked, kidnapped and killed three Israeli soldiers accross the internationally approved border. What did the NYT have to say about this outrage?

That's right, nothing. There was no outraged editorial condemning Hezbollah and arguing that if Israeli concessions are met with more terror how can Israel be expected to concede anything in the future? Nor were there subsequent outraged editorials condemning the unchecked growing capacity of Hezbollah.

The NYT showed that from 2000 - 2006 it didn't much care how the capacity of Israel's enemies grew even without provocation. It didn't care about the growing threats to Israel. So with that in mind consider the end of today's editorial.

One major lesson of the Lebanon experience is that Israel cannot defeat its most dangerous enemies by brute force alone. Its security and survival require a more active diplomacy toward the Palestinians and Syria — and a willingness to take risks. More than ever, Israel needs a government and a leader strong enough to steer it wisely through the uncertain hazards of war and bold enough to test the equally uncertain possibilities for peace.

Actually the lesson is that if left unchecked Israel's enemies will grow, threaten and, when ready, attack. Israel has taken risks (withdrawing from Lebanon and Gaza) and seen no tangible benefits for those risks. For the NYT, for Israel to "steer ... wisely" means absorbing terror without retaliating and then submitting to international supervision that allows its enemies a free hand but constrains Israel. Sorry, the editors of the NYT exist in a different reality from the rest of us. They live in a reality where the UN is honest and effective. Where the Arab world accepts Israel's right to exist. And where terrorists observe the terms of the agreements they make.

I'm not sure that such a world exists outside of an asylum.

(All these editorial came from the NYT though I found some of them at the IHT website. I used the NYT titles, even when the IHT title differed.)

Israel's Two Front Battle NYT July 13, 2006

Kidnapping Israeli soldiers to use as bargaining chips for the release of Arab prisoners is horrible behavior for groups that claim international recognition and political legitimacy, as Hamas and Hezbollah do. The same applies to lobbing rockets over Israel's borders in the hope that they might kill unsuspecting civilians. In response to such unacceptable provocations, Israeli forces are now engaged in major military operations in Gaza, to the south, and in Lebanon, to the north.

But even when acting justifiably in the face of aggression, Israel best serves its long-term security interests by acting wisely and proportionately. Its guiding principle must always be to focus military actions as narrowly as possible on those individuals, organizations and governments directly complicit in the attacks, while sparing the civilian populations that surround them.

Playing Hamas's Game NYT July 15, 2006

The military chieftains of Hamas and Hezbollah fully understand that their primitively armed guerrillas and limited-range unguided missiles are no match for Israel’s world-class military forces. When they engage in provocative operations, like the recent kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and shelling of Israeli towns, they do not expect to win any kind of traditional military victory.

What they more realistically hope for is that the inevitably fierce and devastating Israeli military response will hand them an opportunity to radicalize Arab politics and thereby pressure moderate Arab leaders to distance themselves from Israel and embrace the guerrilla cause. That is a tactic that secular Palestinian guerrilla groups like Fatah pioneered decades ago, and that Islamist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah now use for similar ends.

This perverse dynamic is again coming into play after Israel’s wide-ranging forays into Gaza and Lebanon. Most Arabs are not blaming Hamas and Hezbollah for provoking these Israeli raids. They are blaming Israel for carrying them out.

Diplomacy's turn in Lebanon NYT July 18, 2006

Washington is right to press for the release of the Israeli soldiers held hostage. But this should not be a precondition for the earliest possible cease-fire. Many lives and the stability of the wider region depend on achieving a quick halt to the fighting.

No more foot dragging IHT July 25, 2006

What the people of Lebanon and Israel urgently need is a cease-fire followed by the swift deployment of a well-armed force with a mandate to aggressively keep the peace. That must be accompanied by an international guarantee that Hezbollah will be forced to halt its attacks on Israel permanently and disband its militia so Lebanon can regain control of its borders and its sovereignty.
The White House has resisted calls for a cease-fire, arguing that a return to the situation that existed before the latest fighting would not bring lasting peace. While that is true, we fear that what the administration has been doing is buying Israel more time to pound Hezbollah and Lebanon. Since July 12, hundreds of Lebanese civilians have been killed and nearly a score of Israelis. For all that dying, there is little sign that Hezbollah -- which fired 100 missiles into Israel on Sunday -- has been so deeply wounded that it can't rebuild quickly. Ms. Rice needs to make clear to Israel that more civilian deaths in Lebanon won't make Israelis safer.

A right way to help Israel IHT July 30, 2006

There is a difference between justified and smart. Israel's airstrikes against Hezbollah targets are legitimate so long as Hezbollah wages war against Israel and operates outside the control of the Lebanese government. But the air campaign is now doing Israel more harm than good.
A better answer to the Hezbollah problem would be an immediate cease-fire, paving the way for an international force to patrol Lebanon's southern border. That is what Britain's prime minister, Tony Blair, was pushing for in Washington yesterday, and there were signs that President Bush may be finally coming around.

Ceasefire diplomacy in Lebanon August 1, 2006

The 48-hour limited suspension of air raids that Washington pressed Israel into declaring was a modest step in the right direction, even though, as it became clear Monday, it has far too many exceptions. Too bad that even this partial and temporary restraint came only after dozens of Lebanese civilians, many of them children, were killed by an Israeli air raid on the town of Qana. It took the worldwide uproar over the Qana casualties to finally jolt the Bush administration into asking for something it should have sought many days earlier. Washington's instant turnabout and Israel's instant response has left the damaging impression that had America expressed similar concerns sooner, these and many other innocent Lebanese lives might have been saved.

The Price of not talking to Syria's Assad August 8, 2006

When asked yesterday why the United States isn't talking with Syria about the Lebanon crisis, President Bush replied, "Syria knows what we think." That may be. But Syria is also unlikely to even consider doing what Mr. Bush wants -- rein in Hezbollah and help halt the killing in Lebanon and Israel -- unless its leaders know what potential rewards as well as punishments await them. And for that, the United States needs to offer a serious high-level discussion with Syria, and it needs to do it now.

One month later in Lebanon IHT August 13, 2006

It took unconscionably long -- almost a month -- for the United Nations Security Council to produce a formula to end the fighting in Lebanon. While the diplomats dithered, hundreds of Lebanese and Israelis died, one-third of Lebanon's population was uprooted, and new layers of anger and fear were sown on both sides of the border.
The resolution that the Council finally passed last night will have to be put into effect as quickly and thoroughly as possible, and must lead to a lasting political solution that can avoid future conflicts. That will require more than just an immediate halt to hostilities by both sides and an early withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. It will also require the dispatch of an international military force with sufficient authority and firepower to guarantee that there can be no repeat of the Hezbollah provocations that set off this destructive conflict.

Israel's leaders under fire August 20, 2006

Israelis believe, as we do, that Mr. Olmert was right to respond firmly to Hezbollah's cross-border provocations. Given the implacable hatred of its enemies, Israel cannot afford to show weakness. But it is even more important that whatever it does is done successfully. The military campaign failed to achieve its stated objectives despite its heavy toll in Lebanese and Israeli lives. Now Israelis have a right to ask whether Mr. Olmert rashly raised the ante by demanding the military destruction of Hezbollah without having any clear and realistic strategy for achieving such an ambitious aim.

UPDATE: Deja Vu references this and other cases of media bias here. Thanks to Daled Amos for the mention.

New York Times, Winograd Commission, Israel.