Soccer Dad

Still processing

Dennis Ross focuses today on the Art of the Possible Peace.

The assessment of the common threat perception is correct. But basing policy only on this misses an important regional reality. Priorities differ on how best to respond to the Iranian threat. For the Saudis, weaning Hamas away from Iran and producing intra-Palestinian peace is more important than trying to forge peace between Palestinians and Israelis. For the Israelis, however, an intra-Palestinian peace that entails accommodating Hamas (and that does not require Hamas to change its hostile posture toward Israel) is hardly a basis for reaching out to Palestinians in a way that would satisfy the Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians.

That's reasonable enough.

In Middle Eastern terms, what is logical and possible is intra-Palestinian peace and Palestinian-Israeli calm. That would argue for a comprehensive cease-fire to be negotiated between Abbas and Olmert. A deal would require all Palestinian attacks against Israelis to stop and all smuggling of weapons into Gaza or the West Bank to end. In return, the Israelis would stop all incursions, targeted killings and arrests. As Palestinians demonstrate that they are fulfilling their responsibilities, checkpoints would be lifted and crossing points opened, making economic revitalization possible.

This agreement would differ from previous cease-fires in that it would be negotiated with clear understandings of what constitutes a violation and penalties for violations. Israel might be willing to accept such a deal because Hamas would have to enforce the cease-fire -- not merely observe it. Hamas's readiness to enforce it would mean for the first time that Hamas was acting to prevent "resistance," which would signal that its fundamental credo might be changed.

There's something amusing about this. Ten years after Binyamin Netanyahu came to power demanding "reciprocity" Ross is finally willing to accept the concept. That's really nice. But when it was Netanyahu's idea the Clinton administration portrayed him as a hardliner sending its valentines to Arafat in the vain hope he would change.

The PA was supposed to eliminate incitement, keep its police forces limited to the numbers allowed in the Oslo Accords, stop terror. And it never did. Arafat and the PA learned by using the language of moderation that many decision makers - including the administration in which Ross served - considered them moderates no matter how radical or violent their actual actions were.

So what would make Hamas or any other PA government observe actual metrics of peace now?

Hamas might be willing to accept such a cease-fire for two reasons: First, it needs a respite. Second, in an atmosphere where life is improving and conflict with Israel is deferred, Hamas is likely to believe its superior organization will allow it to supplant Fatah and dominate Palestinian society.

That would be nice if Hamas's main goal was political power. While that's surely one of the goals of the organization, it is by no means its only goal. I'd consider the destruction of Israel to be Hamas's core value to which all other goals and values are subordinate. (This is true of Fatah too.) And I don't see how giving the organization benchmarks is going to convince it to make peace - even the temporary peace of a ceasefire.

Ross is ever the peace processor, looking for what's possible. But no peace is possible as long as Palestinian nationalism is based on the destruction of Israel. That has yet to change and Ross played no small role in allowing that and the resultant violence to continue.

Maybe he has the right idea now, but it is at least ten years too late.

Blogdigger tags: Israel, Palestinians, Peace Process, Dennis Ross.