A number of prominent Iraqis are not happy with the Iraq Study Group's report, including the President Jalal Talabani
Consider Jalal Talabani. A secular-minded Kurd who has probably done more than any other leader to reach out across the country's sectarian divides, Iraq's President is no doubt sympathetic to the report's calls for "national reconciliation." But he reacted strongly to the ISG's suggestion that American support for his democratically elected government be conditioned on its meeting U.S.-determined "milestones" toward that goal. That, he said, was an "insult to the people of Iraq."Mr. Talabani was also critical of the ISG's specific ideas for achieving reconciliation. Having helped bring such Sunni leaders as Adnan Dulaimi into the political process, he clearly understands the importance of giving the Sunnis a fair deal. But he bristled at the report's idea that reconciliation should be achieved through concessions to members of Saddam's Baath Party and other Sunni rejectionists. Fellow Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani echoed that criticism, saying the ISG wanted to reward "those who are against the political process and have conducted acts of violence."
One of the most common criticisms of the Bush administration's Iraq policy is that of the de-Baathification. The criticism goes that the Baathists are the people with governing experience and therefore certain of their numbers should have been included in the government.
Charles Krauthammer in "In Baker's Blunder, A chance for Bush" ( here too )points out that there's been a bit of bipartisan criticism for the results of the bipartisan commission.
The study group has not just been attacked by left and right, Democrat and Republican. It has invited ridicule. Seventy-nine recommendations. Interdependent, insists Baker. They should be taken as a whole. "I hope we don't treat this like a fruit salad and say, 'I like this but I don't like that.' " On the basis of what grand unifying vision? On the authority of what superior wisdom? A 10-person commission including such Middle East experts as Sandra Day O'Connor, Alan Simpson and Vernon Jordan?
Krauthammer criticizes the ISG's proposals for being obvious or unworkable. So what does Krauthammer recommend?
He must do two things. First, as I've been agitating, establish a new governing coalition in Baghdad that excludes Moqtada al-Sadr, a cancer that undermines the Maliki government's ability to work with us. It is encouraging that the president has already begun such a maneuver by meeting with rival Shiite and Sunni parliamentary leaders. If we help produce a cross-sectarian government that would be an ally rather than a paralyzed semi-adversary of coalition forces, we should then undertake part two: "double down'' our military effort. This means a surge in American troops with a specific mission: to secure Baghdad and (together with the support of the Baghdad government -- a sine qua non) suppress Sadr's Mahdi Army.
The question seems to be whether Maliki is weak because of al-Sadr or whether he is just plain weak. If the former, this might work. If not, Maliki needs to be replaced. By whom?
Daniel Pipes has been arguing for awhile that the new boss ought to be the old boss: Ayad Allawi.
UPDATE: More at BuzzTracker.
Blogdigger tags: Iraq Study Group, Iraq, Allawi, Maliki, Charles Krauthammer, Daniel Pipes.