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nissaY

Too many commentators are drawing the absolute wrong lessons from the Israeli killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. I'd say that they got it backwards. In that vein, let's start with the final paragraph of David Ignatius's Machiavelli in the Middle East

It would be fatuous to give the Israelis advice about their security. They live under the shadow of terrorism, and they must find their own solution. But they should consider the evidence of more than two decades that Sharon's approach isn't working. Rather than being humbled into submission, the Palestinians have embraced a strategy of suicidal rage. How will this gruesome cycle of violence end? Today that's impossible to answer. But perhaps both sides could begin by considering the possibility that Machiavelli was wrong. Sometimes it may actually be safer to be loved than feared. An Israel that took risks for peace might find unexpected rewards.

There is so much that it demonstratably wrong in the above paragraph. Again, let's start with the end. When Israel was "loved" that love was taken for weaknewss. The "Aksa Intifada" wouldn't have been possible if the PA and its allied organizations - Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad - hadn't spent the better part of the previous seven years developing their infrastructure and using that infrastructure to acquire weapons.
I know that there are those who attribute the Hadera and Afula terror attacks to the massacre of Baruch Goldstein. But that was when Yitzchak Rabin was Prime Minister and striving to make concessions, and be loved. The terror attacks of February and March 1996 were supposedly in retaliation for the killing of Yihye Ayyash, but they occurred a few months after Israel ceded Tulkarem, Jenin, Ramallah, Beit Lechem, Shechem (Nablus) and Kalkilye to the PA. Again, it's hard to imagine a time when relations between Israel and the PA were better. So terror struck Israel even when it was trying to be loved.
Worse, during those time the PA used its media and educational system to foment hatred of Israel and the Jews inculcating its society with unrelenting, vile imagery that hasn't been seen since the fall of the Third Reich. The "Palestinians have embraced a strategy of suicidal rage" not because of Israeli actions, but because of the hatred that has been taught and validated by every single outlet of the Palestinian Authority.
But since Ignatius says that it would be fatuous of him to give Israel advice on how to provide its own security, let's see if Israel's actions since Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister have been unsuccessful. Here's Austin Bay,
. . . and opportunity

Israel is doing a better job of thwarting terror attacks. Last year saw a third fewer attacks than 2002. Why? Better intelligence, better security tactics and the elimination of Hamas commanders. However, bigger trends prime Mr. Sharon's anti-Hamas offensive.

And more specifically (if slightly outdated, but no less relevant) here's Evelyn Gordon ...
The "Military Solution" Works

The hard data, however, tell a very different story: that while the war on terror is still far from over, it has actually been making impressive progress.

In the intifada's grim second year, from October 2001 through September 2002, Palestinians killed 449 Israelis and foreigners present on Israeli soil, including both civilians and soldiers. Yet for the year that ended last week, this figure was down 47 percent, to 240.

On a monthly basis, the comparison is even more dramatic. Never again has there been a month even approaching the horror of March 2002, the month before Operation Defensive Shield. The 134 Israelis killed that month is more than three times the death toll during the worst month of the past year, and almost 2.5 times the 58 people killed in the second-worst month of the intifada (June 2002, the month after the army withdrew from Palestinian territory following Defensive Shield. It was this renewed surge of killing that persuaded the government to send the troops back and this time, to keep them there).

Furthermore, two of the worst months of the past year were months in which military activity was drastically curtailed: June 2003, with 32 deaths, and August 2003, with 29. June was the month of the road map "peace process," during which Israel largely suspended military operations so as not to disrupt the "momentum toward peace." August was the month of the famous Palestinian cease-fire, to which Israel responded by restricting its own military activity. (In fact, the death toll that August was higher than in 22 of the 34 months without a truce!) One could thus reasonably assume that had Israel maintained the military pressure over the summer, the year's death toll would have been even lower.

The Washington Post's editorial, Mr. Sharon's Solution was no better that the Ignatius column. Two points.

It's true that Sheik Yassin, like Osama bin Laden, oversaw a terrorist organization, but unlike al Qaeda Hamas is also a religious and social movement that holds the allegiance of a substantial segment of Palestinian society. Part of finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves inducing the fundamentalist Islamic movement to pursue its agenda by peaceful means, as have similar groups in Egypt and Jordan.

In response, I bring Aaron Mannes:

In the wake of Israel's assassination of Sheikh Yassin, a number of clichés have been predictably bandied about. The first is the reference to Yassin as the spiritual leader of Hamas. Yassin was really the CEO of a terrorism conglomerate. Hamas has weapons-research programs, international propaganda wings, legal and illegal moneymaking ventures, and a social-welfare network — in addition of course to their core competency, mass murder.

and in response to the Washington Post's assertion:

Some Israelis believed Sheik Yassin was inching in that direction; he recently spoke of accepting a long-term truce with Israel if it withdrew from the West Bank and Gaza. His violent death at Israel's hands seems more likely to postpone rather than accelerate any moderation by his followers.

There is no evidence that, despite what "[s]ome Israelis believe" that Yassin was inching towards moderation. Here is the rule: (More on this later.)

In reality, however, Hamas truce offers are not new. Hamas has, in fact, proposed a ceasefire with Israel no fewer than eleven times since 1993. In most cases, these offers have served to deflect massive Israeli retaliation against the group's leadership in response to a Hamas terrorist act.

And if the regular fare of the Washington Post, wasn't enough, the Washington Post included two Q & A sessions with experts to give it's online readers even greater insight. This was how Henry Siegman answered a perfectly sensible question in Hamas Leader Killed:

Quebec, Canada: The only thing Israel should be criticized for is not having done this sooner. I'll never understand why the world condemns terrorism, yet expects appeasment from Israel. As Bush said, you're either for or against terrorism. There is no neutral ground.

Henry Siegman: The equation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to America's war with Al Qaeda in the aftermath of September 11th, is, I believe entirely inappropriate. Al Qaeda is engaged in an ideological war with the West and with its values. That is not the war Hamas is waging. While its national goals, as officially formulated by them, are extremist, the man who served as Sharon's security advisor until this past September, and before that, as head of Israel's Mossad for four years, has said that Hamas's goals are essentially political, and can be resolved in a political process, but not by means that rely on counter-violence only.

As noted above 1) Israel's counter violence has been working and 2) there is no evidence that Hamas had goals that are political.
And there's this response to another reasonable question:

Wheaton, Md.: Is this assassination a sign that Israel is now taking the war on terrorism seriously? Should we expect the same thing to happen to Arafat and other terrorists in the near future?

Henry Siegman: Israel always took its war against terrorism seriously. The problem is that it did not always pursue it wisely. The question is not whether Yassin deserved what he got, but whether Sharon's targeted assassinations make Israelis more or less secure, and whether it brings an end to the conflict closer or makes it even more distant. It is perfectly legitimate, indeed necessary, for Israel to fight terrorism. But it is an entirely futile struggle, as the past three and a half years have shown, if that struggle is not pursued within a political framework that holds out the prospect of viable Palestinian statehood for the Palestinians if they act to stop the terror. This Sharon has refused to do, and instead has encouraged and subsidized expropriations of Palestinian land in the West Bank.

Wisely? Israel agreed to a Hudna last year with Hamas and for its efforts was hit with increased terror in its wake. A Hudna to Hamas means an opportunity to regroup and re-arm. By contrast, from September to December of 2003, when the leaders of Hamas were known to be in Israel's crosshairs there were no fatal attacks by the organizaiton. Hamas will try to strike back. (And have already tried twice, thankfully, unsuccessfully.) But its capacity has been diminished. Revenge is a motive. And it may eventually lead to success, but not without means and opportunity. Israel has, in effect, degraded the means by which Hamas seeks to attack its civilians.
Lest we think the Washington Post would only bring in experts who support its editorial position, they also brought in Fawaz Gerges. He at least uses history to make his argument in Hamas Leader Killed

Fawaz Gerges: If history serves as a guide, the reaction of Palestinians will be bloody indeed. For example, in March 1996, Israeli assassinated Hamas' chief bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, who was held responsible for the death of dozens of Israelis. Initilaly, Israeli security services boasted about the success of their assassination operation, yet Hamas subsequently retaliated with a wave of suicide bombings, which killed 62 Israelis and injured many others, and terrorized Israeli society.

If Hamas retaliated so brutally to avenge the killing of one of its famous engineers, one can imagine the extent and nature of its response to the assassination of its spiritual leader. Hamas' officials have already promised to avenge his death by killing hundreds of Israelis. It remains to be seen if Hamas can still deliver on its threats. But the writing is on the wall. Ariel Sharon knows full well that Hamas will retaliate and blood will be shed on both sides. Both sides will be worse off.

But history works both ways. Take for example the killing of the Awadallah brothers. This was one of the big successes of the Netanyahu administration:

Six grandiose plans for the carrying out of heinous acts of terrorism, which were at various stages of development by Hamas. This string of terrorist acts, each one more severe than the last, was prevented by the successes of the GSS in Judea and Samaria over the last months. In a series of operations -- most important of which was the liquidation of Adel Awadallah -- the GSS has broken the Hamas military infrastructure in the West Bank. The organization was critically wounded, and the six large-scale acts of terrorism mentioned above were prevented.

Adel Awadallah was responsible for these plans. He was killed on September 10th of this year, together with his brother, at a house in Khirbet a-Taibeh, outside Hebron. The precise details of the killing have, for the most part, remained unknown, but it can now be revealed that in the safe house that they used, a detailed archive was found, which led the GSS to a string of arrests and discoveries, among them of Palestinians whose involvement in terrorism had been unknown up until that point, and allowed investigators to learn many details about the structure and method of operations of Hamas, and also about Awadallah himself.

"The man," said a senior figure in the security services this week, "was the central pivot of Hamas in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem. From the point of view of importance to the organization, he was two ranks above Yihye Ayyash or Muhi a-din a-Sharif, and it may certainly be said that he was the most prominent Hamas commander in the West Bank of any period."

In other words, striking the correct person can have a negative effect on the capacity of a terrorist organization to commit mayhem.
I don't know if Israel is likely to be struck by a new wave or terror or not. My guess is that it won't happen soon, because Yassin was a central figure in Hamas. Even the Israeli observation that there were fewer demonstrations than expected suggests that Israel picked the correct target. The naysayers have the burden of proof.
Crossposted Israpundit and Soccer Dad.

Posted by SoccerDad at March 27, 2004 11:59 PM